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1. Introduction 
 
Cities are home to 75% of Americans, yet these occupy less than 2% of the land area of 
the lower 48 states1. Indeed, urbanisation has increased dramatically over the last century, 
not only in the United States but also in other developed countries. This suggests that the 
benefits of agglomeration are very substantial. However, the nature of those benefits 
remains unclear. The main possibilities include lower transport costs deriving from high 
density and increasing returns to scale in production (Krugman, 1991; Ciccone and Hall, 
1996), knowledge spill-overs between firms (Lucas, 1988; Rauch, 1993), accelerated 
human capital acquisition (Marshall, 1890; Glaeser, 1999), and improved labour market 
matching (Becker and Murphy, 1992; Wheeler, 2001). It has proved difficult to evaluate 
the relative importance of these theories principally because of the lack of suitable 
microdata. 
 
The contribution of this paper is to use a unique dataset to quantify the role of one of the 
main contenders  the matching of workers and jobs. Using linked panels of workers and 
firms for two US states, we show that thicker urban labour markets are associated with 
more assortative matching in the labour market. Another condition is required for this to 
generate higher productivity: complementarity of worker and firm quality in the 
production function (see for example, Kremer and Maskin, 1996). This of course also 
provides the incentive for workers and firms to match assortatively. Our data are uniquely 
suited to address the issue: we have universe longitudinal data on workers and firms, high 
quality data on their place of work and their place of residence, and also new measures of 
worker and firm quality. We use the linked panels of workers and firms to estimate 
worker quality (value of human capital) and firm quality (wage mark-up), using the 
methodology of Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) and Abowd, Lengermann and 
McKinney (2003). We match on to that the spatial coordinates of each worker and each 
firm. With explicit, market-based measures of worker and firm quality, we can directly 
investigate their joint distribution, and characterise how this varies over space and over 
varying labour market thickness in particular.  
                                                           
1 These facts are from Rosenthal and Strange (2003). 
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Our data show that there is a significant urban productivity premium. The raw average 
productivity differential between firms located in counties with a population per square 
mile in the upper decile and those located in counties with population per square mile 
below the median is between 0.15 and 0.3 log points across the states in our sample, in 
favour of the urban firms2.  These raw productivity differentials cannot be accounted for 
by differences in industry structure between urban and rural areas  in fact the urban 
productivity premium is larger within industry. We show that the two conditions for 
matching to matter are met: there is complementarity in production, and workers and 
firms are more assortatively matched in dense labour markets.  Putting these together, we 
calibrate the effect on productivity and show that labor market matching is an important 
source of the urban productivity premium. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section briefly reviews the 
literature on this topic, and the following section sets out a modelling framework for our 
analysis. Section 4 describes the data and section 5 presents the results. The final section 
offers some conclusions. 
 
 
2. Literature 
 
 
Rosenthal and Stranges (2003) recent survey of the evidence on agglomeration 
economies proposes three main categories of effects, largely following Marshall (1890), 
though they also add two others. These are knowledge spillovers, input sharing and 
labour market pooling. Our focus is on the last of these. In their theoretical review, 
Duranton and Puga (2003) emphasize these too, but classify differently into three 
fundamental theoretical mechanisms: sharing, matching and learning. As Rosenthal and 
Strange make clear, there is little direct econometric evidence on the importance of the 
different sources, and of labour market issues in particular. Moretti (2003) surveys the 
evidence on human capital externalities and productivity spill-overs in cities. Ellison and 
Glaeser  (1999) and Rosenthal and Strange (2001) show that some proxies for labour 
                                                           
2 Similar productivity differentials are found if we use employment per square mile in the firms census 
tract as a density measure. 
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market pooling explain the regional degree of spatial correlation quite well. Baumgartner 
(1988) shows that the division of labour is finer in big cities, which suggests a more 
efficient labour market. Labour market pooling is interpreted as a providing a more 
efficient search environment, with lower search frictions. 
  
Search and matching models can be categorised by the degree of agent heterogeneity they 
assume: zero, one- or two-sided.  With no heterogeneity or only one-sided heterogeneity 
there is of course no issue of matching  the homogeneity of one or both sides makes it 
irrelevant3. In models with two-sided heterogeneity the matching or pairing of agents 
becomes an issue, in particular the degree of positive assortative matching (PAM). 
Becker (1973) first discusses PAM in the context of marriage in a frictionless world. He 
shows that complementarity in the household production function generates PAM. 
Shimer and Smith (2000) provide a general analysis and proof of a similar result in a 
model with search frictions4. They provide examples to show that the result does not 
carry over straightforwardly, but they are able to establish restrictions on the production 
function that ensure PAM5. Burdett and Coles (1999) provide a very useful overview of 
the issues and some simple models.  They set out a model with discrete ex ante 
heterogeneity, Nash bargained utilities, and an exogenous arrival rate of offers. They 
show that five types of pure strategy equilibria6 will occur for different specifications of 
the joint production function. In particular sufficient complementarity in production 
yields PAM (the elite equilibrium in their description). For our purposes, the important 
result is that as the offer rate increases (as search frictions decline), the market 
equilibrium tends to the elite outcome (pp. F325, F326). Models also differ by assuming 
either non-transferable utility between the two partners (Burdett and Coles (1997)), or 
transferable utility as in Burdett and Coles (1999), and Shimer and Smith (2000); the 
latter seem more appropriate to the labour market. Delacroix (2003) develops a model of 
the labour market building on Shimer and Smith (2000), discussed below. 
                                                           
3 van den Berg and van Vuuren (2003) and Petrongolo and Pissarides (2003) study the relationship between 
search frictions and wages in such models. 
4 See also Collins and McNamara (1990) for a related analysis of assortative matching. 
5 These are supermodularity of the production function, but also of its log first- and cross-derivatives (see p. 
344).  
6 They note that mixed strategy equilibria can occur but they ignore them. 
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Other papers studying the urban productivity premium relate it to labour market or 
human capital characteristics. Wheeler (2001) considers the issue of differences in urban-
rural wage distributions, and in particular looks at the degree of wage inequality and the 
return to human capital. His model is also based on a search and matching approach, but 
adopts a somewhat unusual search and matching technology. Becker and Murphy (1992) 
study productivity and the division of labour. They formalise Smiths idea that the 
division of labour is constrained by the extent of the market, but add the idea that it is 
also constrained by coordination costs, broadly construed  principal-agent and hold-up 
problems, communication and coordination costs. The relationship to the productivity 
premium in cities is twofold  the division of labour will be finer (and hence productivity 
higher) because of a bigger market, and because of lower coordination costs. Benabou 
(1993) discusses residential segregation and productivity within cities based on 
complementarity between high and low skill workers. The segregation arises from spill-
overs in the acquisition of education. He does not consider worker-firm matching. 
 
However most of the empirical research has been based on surveys of workers, and 
matched employer-employee data are necessary to fully investigate the possibility of 
PAM. Very few studies using such data have had a spatial dimension. Abowd and 
Kramarz (2000) shows that there is an important element of positive sorting between 
workers and firms once data are aggregated with respect to firm characteristics such as 
industry or size. In addition, the study of Burgess, Lane and McKinney (2001) presents 
results showing that the role of assortative matching has increased over time and that this 
has contributed to the changes in wage inequality7.  Andersson (2003) uses matched 
Swedish employer-employee data to estimate a spatial labour demand model and shows 
that high-wage workers sort into urban areas, and that there is an important element of 
positive assortative matching within urban environments.  
 
 
                                                           
7 Note, however, that Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis, 1999; and Abowd, Lengermann and McKinney, 2003 
find that individual measures of the quality of workers and firms are more or less uncorrelated  
correlations only appear when aggregating workers to firms or industries. 
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3. Modelling Framework 
 
 
The starting point for our modelling framework is the results of Burdett and Coles (1999) 
and Shimer and Smith (2000) on the conditions under which models with two-sided 
heterogeneity yield equilibria characterised by positive assortative matching.  
 
We first briefly describe this using the set up of Delacroix (2003). He assumes 
heterogeneity on both sides of the market and a random meeting technology. Agents can 
transfer utility between themselves via the wage setting process. Once created, matches 
are subject to exogenous match breakdowns. The model equilibrium is defined by 
decision rules on who each agent will accept matches with. A number of equilibria with 
different sorting properties are possible. An assumption that income in a non-matched 
state is low rules out some of these. A key assumption on the nature of the production 
function rules out others: that it is supermodular. This implies that high quality agents are 
better off matched with other high quality agents. For example, if there are two low 
quality agents, labelled L, and two high quality agents, labelled H, then a pairing of {LL, 
HH} produces more than {LH, LH}. This is a crucial property of the production function; 
without it there is no particular reason to expect an equilibrium with PAM. With this 
assumption, Delacroix is essentially left with an assortatively matched equilibrium and a 
pooled equilibrium. Kremer and Maskin (1996) discuss this class of production 
technologies in some detail, along with the implications for matching.  
 
Using simulations, Delacroix shows that the PAM equilibrium is more likely as the 
exogenous offer arrival rate increases. This is the theoretical basis for saying that dense 
urban labour markets lead to more sorted matching and therefore, given the nature of the 
production function, higher productivity. 
 
We now set up our empirical model based on this approach, setting up the production 
side and then labour market matching. We discuss the properties of the model, and the 
implications for productivity in equilibrium both with short-run fixed locations, and the 
long-run when workers and firms can relocate between urban and rural areas.  
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Production 
 
We denote the quality of worker i, θi, the quality of firm j as ψj. We assume that the 
firms productivity (yj) depends on both its own quality and the quality of its workers. 
This formulation assumes constant returns to scale, but in the empirical work below we 
show that the results are robust to controlling for firm size. The key feature is the 
interaction term of worker and firm quality, which introduces the incentive for firms to 
sort; we parameterise this in a very straightforward way: 
 
( )∑∑ ∈∈ +++= ji ijji ijj aaay θψβθψ .ln 210     (1) 
 
If the parameter β > 0, a high ψ firm will be more productive with high θ workers.  
 
Matching 
 
Matching equilibrium is described by the joint density function of firm and worker 
qualities. We write this as f (θ, ψ), giving the probability that a firm with quality ψ = Ψ is 
found matched with a worker of quality θ = Θ. Labour market density is denoted δ.  A 
key assumption in the paper is that search frictions are lower in dense labour markets and 
hence job offer arrival rates higher there. If β is positive, we invoke the matching results 
described above to argue that the nature of the matching equilibrium is influenced by 
density, and in particular an equilibrium displaying PAM is more likely in dense markets, 
and a pooled equilibrium more likely in sparse labour markets. In our notation, f (θ, ψ) 
will exhibit greater correlation in dense labour markets. We write this as f (θ, γ; δ ). The 
matching process in this model is something of a black box, but this is a standard feature 
of such an approach. 
 
In the empirical results below we characterise f (θ, γ; δ ) over space (δ ) and calibrate the 
implications for the distribution of productivity. First we derive some properties of the 
matching and production process set out above.  
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Model properties 
 
Using (1) and the matching function, expected productivity for a firm with quality Ψj is 
given by: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )∑∑ ∈∈ ΨΨ+Ψ+Ψ+=Ψ jijjijjj aaay δθβδθ ;|E.;|E|lnE 210  (2) 
 
For illustrative purposes, we summarise the joint distribution of θ and ψ as a simple 
linear regression relationship, Eθ = const + slope.ψ, or 
 
Eθ = const + [ρ(δ).v].ψ       (3) 
 
where ρ is the correlation coefficient of θ and ψ from f(.), and we explicitly include its 
dependence on labour market density, and v = (var(θ )/var(ψ))1/2.  Substituting this into 
(2) and assuming for simplicity just one worker per firm yields: 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )δρβδρβ .....|lnE 2210 vvaconstaay jjjj Ψ+++Ψ+=Ψ   (4) 
 
Note that if there is no complementarity in the production function (β = 0), and no PAM 
process (ρ = 0), then productivity is simply equal to a constant plus a1Ψ.    
 
The properties of this are apparent from Figure 1. Panel A shows that for low ψ firms, 
there is little difference in productivity between high and low density locations, whereas 
for high ψ firms there is a substantial difference. Equivalently, there is much greater 
dispersion of productivity levels across space among high ψ firms than for low ψ firms. 
Panel B also shows that high ψ firms face a strong gradient of productivity in density, 
while low ψ firms do not. It also shows a high dispersion of productivity levels across 
firms in denser locations. These are testable in our data. 
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Worker and Firm relocation  selection and sorting 
 
We consider here the equilibrium once re-location between markets is allowed8. Take 
two markets, a city (c) with high density and so high correlation between worker and firm 
quality (ρc), and a rural area (r) with low density (ρr). In each area there are n workers 
and n jobs, and θ and ψ in both areas are uniformly distributed between 0 and 1 9, so 
rcjjj ,,21 ===ψθ . If moving between markets is impossible, workers and jobs would 
be matched according to ρc and ρr respectively; this is illustrated in Figure 2. To keep 
notation simple, we assume that ρr = 0, and hence that crc ρρρρ =−≡∆ . We continue to 
write ∆ρ to show that it is the correlation and density differential that matters. 
  
Suppose that relocating costs c in either direction and for both workers and jobs. Clearly, 
the high value workers in the rural areas and the low value workers in the city will 
consider moving to the other market. The decision for jobs is identical. Specifically, a 
high θ rural worker will move if: 
 
( ) ( ) cEE rc −+>+ θψθθψθ ||       (5) 
 
where Ec (Er) denotes the expectation under the city (rural) distribution. Substituting in 
from (3), this yields a threshold value such that rural workers will move if: 
 
θ
ρ
θθ
)
≡
∆
+>
vc.         (6) 
 
where ∆ρ = ρc - ρr. Note that this only makes sense for 1≤θ
)
, which implies the 
restriction that c.v/∆ρ ≤ 1/2. Similarly, a low θ city worker will move if: 
 
                                                           
8 There are of course many models of urban-rural relocation (e.g. Diamond and Tolley, 1982). In this 
section we follow through the consequences of allowing such relocation for our productivity model. 
9 This very simple symmetric set up just keeps things simple and ensures that the relative variance term is 
unaffected by the relocation of workers and jobs. Generalizing to allow for different distributions of job and 
worker quality, and different initial city and rural distributions would add little additional insight. 
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θ
ρ
θθ
(
≡
∆
−<
vc.         (7) 
 
There are identical re-location thresholds for firms, ψ) and ψ( . Thus the steady-state 
allocation will involve no workers (jobs) in the city below ( )ψθ (( , and none in the rural 
market above ( )ψθ )) . The allocation will appear as in Figure 310. This implies two things. 
First, the population of workers in each market is selected through this relocation process. 
Second, the relocation mechanism accentuates the impact of the matching effect by 
raising mean θ and ψ in the city and reducing them in the rural area. In this model, the 
rural mean is given by: 
 
2
.
4
1






∆
+==
ρ
ψθ vcrr         (8)  
  
Note that this is increasing in c and decreasing in ∆ρ. At c = 0, θθ =
)
 and the rural mean  
is 1/4. Similarly, the city mean is: 
 
2
.
4
1
2
1






∆
−+==
ρ
ψθ vccc        (9) 
 
which is decreasing in c and increasing in ∆ρ . The city/rural difference in mean θ (and 
mean ψ ) is ( ) 0.221 2 ≥∆− ρvc , depending negatively on (c.v/∆ρ), with ∆ρ in turn 
depending positively on ∆δ, the density differential. Areas with low relocation costs or 
big density differentials will see substantial differences in mean worker and job quality 
between cities and adjacent rural areas.  
 
                                                           
10  This split of the labour force into a randomly matched population in rural areas and an assortatively 
matched population in urban areas is similar to Acemoglus (1997) hybrid model of matching, with a 
spatial dimension added. 
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We consider the implications of relocation for productivity differences. We take the 
simplest model for productivity; take a firm with quality Ψ , matched with a worker of 
quality Θ : 
 
( ) 0,. >ΨΘ+Ψ+Θ= ββy       (10) 
 
Mean productivity in a market depends on the joint distribution of θ and ψ.  Noting that  
( ) ),cov(E ψθψθθψ ++= 11, we have for the short run (no relocation): 
 
City: Vy cc βρψθβψθ +++=E       (11a) 
Rural: ψθβψθ ++=ryE        (11b) 
 
where ( ) ( )ψθ var.var=V , and recalling that ρr = 0. The productivity gap is therefore 
β∆ρV, increasing in β, the importance of the complementarity, ∆ρ, the difference in 
sorting, and V, the scope for reallocation. Using the expressions for the city and rural 
quality means derived above, and recalling that rcjjj ,, ==ψθ , we get for equilibrium: 
 
City: ( ) Vy cccc βρθβθ ++= 22E       (12a) 
Rural: ( )22E rrry θβθ +=        (12b) 
 
In this case, the productivity differential is ( ) ( ) VVrcrc ρβρβθθβθθ ∆>∆+−+− 222  since 
rc θθ > . Using (8) and (9) above, this simplifies to: 
 
( ) Vvc ρβρβ ∆+











∆
−+
2
.2
2
12  or 
                                                           
11 See Mood, Graybill and Boes (1974) p. 180, though this essentially follows simply from the definition of 
a covariance. 
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( )( ) Vrc ρβθθβ ∆+−+2        (13) 
 
So the equilibrium impact of assortative matching on productivity exceeds the short-run 
impact by a factor depending positively on β, the importance of the complementarity, 
positively on ∆ρ, the difference in sorting, and negatively on c, the relocation cost.  
 
Thus in equilibrium, assortative matching has two effects on the urban productivity 
premium  the direct effect from sorting plus complementarity in production, and the 
consequent relocation which accentuates this by inducing a difference in mean match 
quality. We can see this also referring back to panel B of Figure 1, and thinking of the 
mass of firms distributed vertically between the high ψ and low ψ lines. As we have just 
shown, once relocation is allowed, this distribution will be concentrated near the lower 
line in a rural (low ρ) area and concentrated near the higher line in an urban area (high ρ). 
Thus the overall gradient of productivity with respect to density will be steeper than a 
line simply bisecting the two curves shown.  
 
The implications of this for the econometric work below are as follows. We can recover 
the short run impact of assortative matching by controlling for the distribution of θ and ψ 
in each area. In the context of this simple model, the unconditional relationship between 
productivity and density would reflect the long run relationship with relocation. 
However, it seems unlikely that in the world generating our data, no other factor produces 
a difference in mean quality between areas, in which case it is harder to estimate the long 
run impact of assortative matching. The results above show that we should expect a 
greater difference in mean quality across areas with bigger differences in density, and this 
provides one channel for gauging the importance of the relocation story. 
 
 
4. Data 
 
 
As we indicated in the Introduction, our data provide a unique opportunity to directly 
examine the spatial interaction between firms and workers. In particular, we have 
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universe longitudinal data on workers and firms, and high quality data on their place of 
work and their place of residence. This enables us to construct very detailed measures of 
density. We also make use of new market-based measures of worker and firm quality. 
 
The new database that enables us to match workers with past and present employers has 
been assembled at the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics Program at the U.S. 
Census Bureau (Abowd, Haltiwanger and Lane, 2004) . This database consists of 
quarterly records of the employment and earnings of almost all individuals from the 
unemployment insurance systems of a number of US states in the 1990s  these provide 
the key link between workers and firms.  These type of data have been extensively 
described elsewhere (Haltiwanger, Lane and Spletzer, 2000), but it is worth noting that 
there are several advantages over household based, survey data. In particular, the 
earnings are quite accurately reported, since there are financial penalties for misreporting. 
The data are current, and the dataset is extremely large. The Unemployment Insurance 
records have also been matched to internal administrative records at the Census Bureau 
that contain information on date of birth, place of birth, race, and sex for all workers, thus 
providing limited demographic information12.  One limitation of the data is that there are 
no direct data links between workers and establishments, but only between workers and 
firms. Thus, we cannot tell with certainty in which particular establishment a worker is 
employed, if the employing firm consists of more than one establishment, which is true of 
about 30% of the workforce. Thus, probabilistic links are used to impute a place of work 
for workers who work for multi-unit businesses.13 
                                                           
12 Given the sensitive nature of the dataset, it is worth discussing the confidentiality protection in some 
detail. All data that are brought in to the LEHD system have been anonymized in the sense that standard 
identifiers and names are stripped off and replaced by a unique Protected Identification Key or PIK.  
Only Census Bureau employees or individuals who have Special Sworn Status are permitted to work with 
the data, and they have not only been subject to an FBI check but also are subject to a $250,000 fine and/or 
five years in jail if the identity of an individual or business is disclosed.  All projects have to be reviewed 
by the Census Bureau and other data custodians, and any tables or regression results that are released are 
subject to full disclosure review 
13 These probabilistic links have been estimated in the LEHD data using multiple imputation techniques, 
based on a model that takes into account of the relative location of workers and establishments, the 
employment distribution across establishments and dynamic employment restrictions imposed by worker 
and job flow dynamics. We have verified that the statistical properties of the probabilistic links do not 
affect our results, by comparing our results with those obtained from subsamples in which direct links 
between workers and firms are available (i.e., in the Minnesota data and for workers employed in single-
establishment firms in the two states). 
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The geographic information that exists on the dataset is extremely detailed.  The physical 
location of each establishment is geocoded to the latitude and longitude level, as is the 
place of residence of each worker (from 1999 on). This information is available on a 
longitudinal, annual basis (geocoded businesses are available all years and residences 
have been geocoded in 1999, 2000 and 2001). This allows us to describe the geographical 
distribution of workers and employers as well as commuting and mobility patterns. In this 
study we use data on workers and their employers in 2001 for two large states  
California and Florida  - covering about 47 million workers employed in about 7 million 
firms.   
 
We use two different density measures  population and employment per square mile  
for two different geographical units  Census Tracts and Counties.14 There are 
advantages and disadvantages associated with each of these measures. Aggregated 
measures of density in a county could be somewhat misleading, to the extent that 
counties often cover large areas containing both urban and rural parts. Also, counties do 
not respect the boundaries of local labour markets. Census tracts, on the other hand, are 
relatively small areas of between 1,500 and 8,000 individuals, and while they are not 
designed to be a local labour market, they are chosen to be relatively homogeneous in 
terms of population characteristics, economic status, and living conditions. Thus, tract-
based density measures will pick up some of the within-county variation in density. 
However, the small size of tracts is not unproblematic either. While population and 
employment density measures are very highly correlated at the County level, this is not 
always true in tracts. In urban areas tracts cover a small area by construction, which in 
many cases means that either the population per square mile is high  if it is in the 
residential areas of the city  or the employment per square mile is high  if it is in the 
commercial districts of the city  but the two measures are not necessarily highly 
correlated. To check whether our results are sensitive to the level of geographical 
aggregation, we estimate our results using all four measures of density.  Gautier and 
                                                           
14 Population estimates by County and Census Tract are available to us in Decennial Census data. 
Employment estimates are based on LEHD data.  
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Teulings (2000) propose a different empirical measure of labour market density based on 
revealed preference on commuting patterns which they implement on data from PUMAs, 
which have around 100,000 people in. However, since these are far more aggregated than 
our areas we decided to keep with the standard jobs per unit area as our measure of 
employment density.  
 
In addition to this information, the LEHD program staff have constructed measures of 
individual worker quality, θ , and of firm wage premia,ψ -  which have been attached to 
the records of each worker and firm in the dataset. While these are straightforward to 
describe, they were empirically difficult to compute until new econometric techniques 
were recently developed (see Abowd and coauthors)15.  The individual quality measure is 
a fixed effect that summarizes the individual wage premium (or discount) that an 
individual carries with him/her as she moves from firm to firm.  This human capital 
measure can be thought of as the market value of the portable component of an 
individuals skill set   - and includes some factors that are often observable to the 
statistician, such as years of education and gender; and some factors that are often not, 
such as innate ability, people skills, problem solving skills, perseverance, family 
background, and educational quality. The firm fixed effect is a summary measure of the 
wage premium (or discount) that each firm pays to observationally equivalent workers.  
This wage premium, which we refer to as an index of firm quality, can reflect a variety of 
different factors such as the organisational structure, the degree of rent-sharing, the 
capital intensity, or the degree of unionisation at a firm (see Andersson, Holzer and Lane, 
2004, for a non-technical description).  These new measures enable the effect of worker 
and firm characteristics on earnings outcomes to be separated for the first time.  
 
Table 1 shows the correlation between different wage components in California, Florida, 
Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota, North Carolina, and Texas over the period 1985 to 2000.16 
The first thing to note is the explanatory power of this decomposition. The correlation 
between the residual and the wage measure is 0.402, which translates into an R2 of about 
                                                           
15 Abowd, Lengermann and McKinney (2003).  
16 The information in this table is extracted from Table 6 in Abowd, Lengermann and McKinney (2003).   
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85%. The second thing to note is the importance of firm effects. The simple pairwise 
correlation of the estimated firm effect and earnings is 0.484. This number is 
substantially higher than the correlation between the effects of observable personal 
characteristics and earnings and comparable to the correlation between the effects of 
unobservable person characteristics and earnings. Finally, note that firm and worker 
effects are virtually uncorrelated, which is true for the two individual states we study 
here. We show below that there is an important element of positive assortative matching 
once the spatial dimension of data is incorporated. 
 
Our final key measure is the productivity of the establishment. The data from the 
Economic Census in 1997 provide measures of sales at the establishment level, which, 
together with employment, is used to create a proxy for productivity  sales (or revenue) 
per worker.  This is similar to the measure used by Haltiwanger, Lane and Spletzer 
(1999; 2001).  Although clearly the preferred productivity measure would be value-added 
per hour, Haltiwanger, Lane and Spletzer point out that there is a close correspondence 
both conceptually and in terms of measurement between this measure of gross output at 
the establishment level and the industry-level measures published by BLS17 . The 
standard BLS measure of labour productivity at the detailed industry level is output per 
hour. 
 
5. Results 
 
 
We first present results on establishment level productivity analysis. We then model the 
matching outcome, and finally turn to calibrate the impact of density on productivity 
outcomes. 
 
                                                           
17 As they point out It is worth noting that for most sectors there are not highly reliable measures of value 
added per hour even at the industry level that differ from the measures of gross output per hour.  The reason 
is that materials usage data is poor in most sectors other than manufacturing.  As Triplett and Bosworth 
(2001) note, for most service sector industries the correlation between gross output per hour measures from 
BLS and value-added per hour measures from BEA is extremely high for many service sector industries 
because the measurement of materials usage is poor  a finding reinforced by Foster et al, 2001. 
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a) Productivity 
 
We confirm the urban productivity premium by calculating simple correlations of density 
with productivity and productivity dispersion, at both the tract and the county levels.  As 
is clear from an examination of the results in Table 2, geographic areas that have higher 
employment density are indeed more productive  and Table 3 confirms that workers in 
dense geographic areas are also higher paid. Recall that one of the properties of the model 
outlined in section 3 was that productivity dispersion should also be positively correlated 
with density, and the data confirm this.  
 
In order for assortative matching to contribute to higher productivity, there must be 
complementarities in production between high quality workers and high quality firms. In 
order to investigate this, we examine the relationship between worker quality θ and firm 
quality, ψ , and productivity (at the establishment level), while controlling for firm size 
and industry18. The results of this are reported in table 4.  Clearly, the statistical strength 
and magnitude of the coefficients on worker and firm quality show the importance of 
these inputs. However, the critical part for our purposes is the degree of complementarity 
between those inputs, which is captured by the interaction term. In both California and 
Florida this is statistically significant and positive. This provides the incentive for firms 
and workers to match assortatively, and the mechanism that yields higher productivity if 
they are successful in doing so. We return to its quantitative significance in section (c) 
below. 
 
We also check alternative less restrictive specifications. Since productivity at the 
establishment level might depend less on average worker quality than on the distribution 
of workforce quality, we calculate three different measures  the quality of workers in the 
25th, 50th, and 75th percentile of the human capital distribution at the establishment  and 
include these as independent variables in the regression. The results in Table 5 also 
support the finding of complementarity in production, and hence that the estimates of the 
productivity relationship using mean quality do not do any great violence to the data.  
                                                           
18 We did not experiment in terms of different functional forms in these regressions. 
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In addition, we check whether differences in industrial structure are driving these 
findings of a significant complementarity between worker and firm quality, and report the 
results in Table 6 of running the analysis separately by industry. The California results 
indicate that the interaction is significantly positive in 5 industries, and significantly 
negative in none. In Florida, there is a positive effect in all but wholesale trade.  
 
These results support the existence of widespread and strong positive quality interactions 
(complementarity) in productivity and set the scene for the possibility of finding PAM 
equilibria in high arrival rate labour markets. 
 
b) Matching 
 
 
The second empirical question is whether high quality firms and high quality workers are 
more likely to co-exist in urban than in rural areas.  In this section we characterise the 
joint density function of worker and firm quality, f(θ, ψ), and the way in which this varies 
with the density of the labour market. Clearly, although we can only define a matching 
correlation over an aggregate of individuals and firms, there is no unique way to define a 
market over which to compute this correlation. We therefore adopt two different 
straightforward scales  a census tract, which is smaller than a labour market, and a 
County.  Whilst theory suggests a clear cut-off between pooled matching and assortative 
matching, the fact that our empirical areas will not perfectly correspond to true labour 
markets means that we should expect to see smoother changes. We characterise the joint 
density using a number of techniques: first graphically and with maps; second non-
parametrically, estimating the joint density with kernel estimators in different labour 
markets; and third using regression. 
  
Graphs and maps 
 
Simple cross-plots of employment density and the matching correlation are presented in 
Figures 4 and 5 for the two states. These show a clear positive relationship between the 
 20
two, regardless of whether the tract or the county level of detail are used19. To get some 
feel for the spatial structure underlying these plots, maps for California are shown in 
Figures 6 and 7. Particularly Figure 7 at tract level, these show considerable variation in 
density and correlation.  
 
Non-parametric characterisation 
 
While the simple correlation coefficient and the regressions reported below provide 
useful summaries of the bivariate density function, f(θ, ψ), it is helpful to get some 
impression of the overall distribution. In order to illustrate the difference in the 
distributions between areas, we compute the density over (θ, ψ) space separately in urban 
and rural tracts20, and subtract the latter from the former. The theoretical counterpart to 
this is the right-hand panel of Figure 3 minus the left-hand panel. 
 
In Figure 8 we plot the contours of this difference in distribution for tracts in California, 
focussing on manufacturing and retail industries. To reduce other sources of 
heterogeneity, we focus on a particular group of workers  males, aged 35  55 years old.  
Panel A (manufacturing) of the figure shows a clear north-east  south-west axis, with 
higher density in urban tracts in the top right quadrant. Whilst part of this is a reflection 
of just higher quality workers and firms in urban areas, there is also an impression that 
more of the mass of the density is close to the 45o line in the urban area, and that the 
distribution is more diffuse in the rural area. Panel B looks at the retail sector. Again 
there is a clear north-east  south-west orientation, but the pattern is otherwise less clear 
because of the compression of firm effects relative to worker effects. 
 
Parametric characterisation 
 
Table 7 provides county and tract level regressions of the matching correlation on 
density. The dependent variable is the matching correlation over the areal units shown  
county and tract. We control for the mean level of worker and firm quality. The 
regressions show a positive and statistically significant effect of (employment) density on 
                                                           
19 These graphs use population density, but the results are the same using employment density. 
20 This uses a bivariate kernel estimation technique. See Press et al (1988).  
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the matching correlation. This is true for both spatial scales in both California and 
Florida. Of the other variables, worker quality seems to matter in California, but not in 
Florida.  
 
We then exploit all the data we have and run individual level regressions for both of our 
states. These are not to be interpreted causally, but rather as summaries of the joint 
density of worker and firm quality, and its dependence on density. An individual 
workers quality is regressed on her matched firm quality, local density, and an 
interaction of quality and density. As before, this latter interaction term is the focus of 
interest as it shows how the matching equilibrium varies over labour markets of different 
densities. The results in Table 8 show very clearly that the interaction term is positive and 
significant, regardless of the spatial scale used, and for both states. Again we interpret the 
size of the effect through the impact on productivity. 
 
In summary, the results of this section have established that the degree of assortative 
matching does increase significantly with the thickness of the labour market.  
 
 
c) Calibration of productivity effect 
 
The results in the previous sections have established the necessary preconditions for 
assortative matching to contribute to productivity.  In this section we calibrate the effects 
across areas with different densities by examining differences across firms in two 
different employment density levels  low density and high density.  The first panel of 
Table 9 demonstrates that the mean productivity of firms is about .19 log points higher in 
high density areas than low density areas; firm quality is about .15 log points higher; and 
worker quality about .14 log points higher.  
 
We use the estimates above in equation (2) (repeated here) to examine the impact of 
location on a firms expected productivity. For example, for a firm with quality Ψj  in 
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California, we compute its expected productivity at two locations with different 
employment densities.   
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )∑∑ ∈∈ ΨΨ+Ψ+Ψ+=Ψ jijjijjj ffaaay δθβδθ ;|E.;|E|lnE 210  (2) 
 
In the second panel of Table 9, we see that the fitted differences for the average firm in a 
high density for all firm values is around 0.1 log points. This can be compared to the 
overall urban premium of 0.19 log points shown in the first panel  and makes it clear 
that this approach predicts a substantial part of the urban productivity premium.  
Interestingly, the importance varies depending on which part of the firm quality 
distribution is fitted to equation (2)  ranging from .107 for firms one standard deviation 
above the mean to .083 for firms one standard deviation below mean firm quality. 
 
However, this exercise, while controlling for spatial differences in firm quality, does not 
control for difference in mean worker quality between urban and rural areas. To isolate 
the pure direct role of matching, separately from the sorting effect, we need to control for 
both the worker and firm quality in each area. Of course, in the model set out above, the 
sorting between rural and urban areas occurs in response to the matching. To do this we 
construct the following counter-factuals of matched worker-firm pairs and compare the 
resulting productivity with actual productivity. First, we count the number of job slots in 
each area  Census Tract or County - and keep this constant to maintain area differences 
in density. We then generate a random allocation of firms and workers, with a firm and 
worker quality value randomly assigned to each job slot. This simulates the short-run 
before relocation of firms and workers takes place. The next step is to randomly match a  
worker (a quality value) to each firm. This yields a random sorting and matching 
situation with no expected differences in productivity across areas. Since we now want to 
isolate the short-run or pure effect of non-random matching, we keep the resources 
(worker and firm qualities) in each area constant and simply reshuffle them according to 
three different matching regimes: perfect positive assortative matching, perfect negative 
assortative matching, and actual matching, where the latter is based on the actual 
correlations between worker and firm effects in each area. Finally, having created new 
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worker-firm pairs, we use the estimated productivity function to calculate productivity for 
each pair. In each case, when we probabilistically match workers and firms, we do this 
100 times and present the mean outcome. 
 
The results are presented in Table 10, holding the resources constant across tracts, and in 
Table 11, holding the resources constant across Counties. The results show that the 
effects of matching patterns on productivity are sizeable. The first block of each table 
refers to outcomes with random sorting of workers and firms across rural and urban 
areas. Taking the top three rows, it is clear that with complementarity in the production 
function positive assortative matching produces considerably higher productivity than the 
other matching regimes. Holding worker and firm quality fixed, the difference between 
positive and negative assortative matching is 0.056 in urban tracts and 0.062 in urban 
Counties. Thus patterns of worker-firm matching matter. Because of the random sorting 
in this part of the table, rural and urban areas have (in expectation) the same resources, 
and so this difference between matching regimes is the same for both areas. In row 4 we 
allow for the difference in actual matching patterns across rural/urban areas, reflecting 
the greater degree of positive assortative matching in cities. Productivity in rural areas is 
about the same as with random matching (0.002 at tract scale and 0.001 for Counties). 
In urban areas, it is about half way between random and perfect positive assortative 
matching, 0.016 at tract scale and 0.015 at County scale. Thus, the direct short-run 
productivity effect of differences in matching between urban and rural areas is 0.013 at 
tract scale and 0.017 at County scale. It is a feature of all the results in these two tables 
that the effects are stronger at County scale. This makes sense  Counties hold 
considerably more firms and workers and so the scope for productivity gains from 
relocation is greater.  
 
The second block of tables 10 and 11 relate to the long run influence of matching, and are 
based on the actual distribution of worker and firm quality between urban and rural areas. 
First, we see that the sorting of higher quality workers and firms into urban areas is 
important for productivity differences and dominates the direct short-run effect of 
matching. Second, at the County scale (table 11), the actual sorting of firms matters 
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considerably more than the actual sorting of workers, and explains more of the urban 
productivity difference.  Third, the role of matching can be seen by comparing row 7 
(random matching) and row 8 (actual matching). At the County scale, productivity 
increases 0.047 log points (from 0.147 to 0.194) in urban areas once we apply the actual 
matching patterns in the data, and 0.031 (from 0.142 to 0.109) in rural areas; the 
differences are smaller at tract scale. The difference in these differences, the direct 
contribution of matching to the urban productivity premium given the actual sorting of 
workers and firms, is 0.016. This is essentially the same as the 0.017 figure based on 
random sorting. At tract scale, the difference is in fact marginally greater in rural tracts 
giving a small negative contribution of 0.005 to the premium  compare 0.243 (actual 
matching) and 0.248 (random matching). We attribute this anomaly to the much smaller 
scale of tracts making them susceptible to outliers in the re-matching process. Overall, 
these results show that pure differences in matching patterns are quantitatively important 
for productivity. They also show that the long-run allocation of high quality workers and 
firms to urban areas is more important, and we finally turn to explore the implications of 
our model for that. 
 
Equation (13) shows that the difference in the long-run and short-run contributions of 
matching to the urban-rural productivity differential is ( )( )rc θθβ −+2 . We can use our 
estimates to quantify this for California: β is estimated at 0.028 (Table 4), cθ  is 0.10, and 
rθ  is 0.04 (Table 9). This gives a value of 0.284, and combining this with the direct 
effect of matching of 0.017 (County scale) yields a long-run productivity differential of 
0.301. Given the simple nature of the assumptions in the model, the fact this is so close to 
the actual value of 0.305 across Counties is no doubt coincidence. But the fact that it is of 
the right order of magnitude is interesting and does suggest that matching and the 
consequent relocation is an important component of productivity differentials.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
 
In this paper we address the puzzle of the urban productivity premium. While it is clear 
that this is substantial, the literature is unclear what it derives from. We take one of the 
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main contenders and test it using a new micro dataset. Our results suggest that assortative 
matching in thick urban labour markets plus complementarities in production play an 
important role in generating high productivity in cities. Using non-parametric techniques 
and simple regression analysis we show that the degree of matching of firm and worker 
quality does vary with labour market density, and we establish that there is evidence of 
complementarity in production. Putting these together, we show that this contributes to 
the urban premium.  
 
The paper also illustrates the insights of the search and matching approach to labour 
markets, and the power that the new emerging datasets offer in addressing long-standing 
questions. There are other related issues that we can tackle: for example, segregation and 
networks in cities, earnings and local labour markets, residential and commuting patterns. 
Complementarity in production plus assortative matching also imply greater wage 
inequality in denser labour markets. We leave all these to future work. 
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 Figure 1: Productivity, Density and Firm Quality 
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Figure 2: Short run 
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Figure 3: Equilibrium 
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Figure 4: Matching and Density in California 
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Figure 5: Matching and Density in Florida 
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Figure 6: Matching and Density in California, County Level Maps 
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Figure 7: Matching and Density in California, Tract Level Maps 
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Figure 8: Kernel estimates of (θ, ψ) density in California, Men aged 35-55: urban vs rural Census Tracts 
Panel A: Manufacturing     Panel B: Retail Trade 
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 Table 1: Summary of Estimated Wage Components  
Component Standard Correlation with 
 Deviation y xβ  θ  ψ ε 
Log real annual wage rate (y)  0.881  1.000  0.224  0.468  0.484  0.402 
Time-varying personal characteristics (xβ)  0.691  0.224  1.000 -0.553  0.095  0.000 
Person effect (θ)  0.835   0.468 -0.553  1.000  0.080  0.000 
Firm effect (ψ)  0.362  0.484  0.095  0.080  1.000  0.000 
Residual (ε)  0.354  0.402  0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000 
Note: Based on 287,241,891 annual observations from 1986 to 2000 for 68,329,212 persons and 3,662,974 
firms in California, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota, North Carolina, and Texas.  
Source: Table 6 in Abowd, Lengermann and McKinney (2003) and based on data from the LEHD Program 
Employment Dynamics Estimates Database.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Correlations between productivity, productivity dispersion and density 
 California Florida 
 Tract County Tract County 
Corr(P,E) 0.38470** 0.48881** 0.52118** 0.72582** 
Corr(PD,E) 0.25540** 0.70943** 0.20736** 0.27526* 
N 7049 58 3154 67 
Note: Corr(P,E) is the correlation between the mean of log of labor productivity and log of employment per 
square mile across the geographical units (Tract or County) within each state. PD is the standard deviation 
of log of labor productivity across firms within the geographical unit. ** significant at 1%, * significant at 
5%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Correlations between wages, wage dispersion and density 
 California Florida 
 Tract County Tract County 
Corr(W,E) 0.36633** 0.52526** 0.43080** 0.74802** 
Corr(WD,E) 0.18065** 0.5589** 0.32757** 0.65951** 
Corr(W9010,E) 0.09518** 0.24685 0.17217** 0.50402** 
N 7049 58 3154 67 
Note: Corr(W,E) is the correlation between the mean of log of annualized earnings and log of employment 
per square mile across the geographical units (Tract or County) within each state. PD is the standard 
deviation of log of annualized earnings across all workers within the geographical unit. ** significant at 
1%, * significant at 5%. 
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Table 4: Firm-level productivity regressions as a function of mean human capital 
 California Florida 
0.430 0.346 (1): Mean person effect 
(163.46)** (82.46)** 
(2): Firm effect 0.638 0.568 
 (246.76)** (129.79)** 
0.028 0.059 Interaction term between (1) and (2) 
(14.92)** (15.92)** 
Constant 4.828 4.739 
 (686.22)** (468.25)** 
Observations 400770 152367 
R-squared 0.29 0.24 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of labor productivity. In addition the specification includes controls 
for size and industry of firm (not reported in table). ** significant at 1%, * significant at 5%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Firm-level productivity regressions as a function of human capital 
distribution. 
 California Florida 
(1): 25:th percentile of person effect 0.060 0.102 
 (32.67)** (6.04)** 
(2): 50:th percentile of person effect 0.142 0.063 
 (35.07)** (16.14)** 
(3) 75:th percentile of person effect 0.164 0.111 
 (8.05)** (16.53)** 
(4): firm effect 0.631 0.571 
 (188.57)** (95.02)** 
Interaction term between (1) and (4) -0.016 0.017 
 (2.79)** (1.90) 
Interaction term between (2) and (4) 0.035 0.026 
 (3.29)** (1.63) 
Interaction term between (3) and (4) 0.024 0.024 
 (3.88)** (2.50)* 
Constant 4.832 4.739 
 (670.70)** (457.08)** 
Observations 396020 150756 
R-squared 0.29 0.24 
 Note: The dependent variable is the log of labor productivity. In addition the specification includes 
controls for size and industry of firm (not reported in table). ** significant at 1%, * significant at 5%. 
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Table 6: Coefficients on the interaction term between mean person effect and firm 
effect from firm-level productivity regressions by industry 
  California Florida 
Construction -0.003 0.065** 
Manufacturing 0.012 0.022** 
Transportation & Utilities 0.065** 0.093** 
Wholesale Trade 0.007 0.014 
Retail Trade 0.148** 0.108** 
FIRE 0.033** 0.046** 
Business Services -0.004 0.031** 
Health Services 0.010* 0.034** 
Educational Services -0.033 0.175** 
Other Services 0.013** 0.056** 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of labor productivity. In addition the specification by industry 
includes controls for mean person effect, firm effect, size and a constant (not reported in table). ** 
significant at 1%, * significant at 5%. 
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Table 7: Regressions of matching correlation, corr(θ,ψ) on density and average 
human capital estimates 
 California Florida 
 Tract County Tract County 
0.122 -0.322 0.002 -0.099 Mean of person 
effect (9.61)** (2.66)* (0.10) (0.79) 
0.053 0.168 0.009 -0.012 Mean of firm 
effect (7.27)** (1.79) (0.71) (0.19) 
0.005 0.020 0.007 0.019 Log of emp./sq. 
mile (8.63)** (4.55)** (7.64)** (5.35)** 
Constant 0.015 0.008 -0.024 -0.054 
 (3.11)** (0.27) (4.09)** (3.51)** 
Observations 7013 58 3134 67 
R-squared 0.06 0.47 0.02 0.38 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Matching regressions. Dependent variable: estimated person effect (θ) 
 California Florida 
Geographical unit of  
density measure 
Census 
Tract 
County Census 
Tract 
County 
     
(1): Firm effect 0.171 0.180 -0.044 -0.039 
 (53.60)** (55.63)** (8.87)** (5.78)** 
0.019 0.021 0.016 0.031 (2): Log of 
employment/sq. mile (129.06)** (112.48)** (73.83)** (77.12)** 
0.006 0.007 0.023 0.030 Interaction term 
between (1) and (2) (15.41)** (13.37)** (35.90)** (25.66)** 
Constant -0.058 -0.030 0.003 -0.049 
 (45.00)** (24.51)** (1.99)* (20.88)** 
Observations 9,000,959 9,000,959 5376886 5376886 
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 
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Table 9: Calibrating Productivity Differences  California 
 Employment Density  Difference 
 Low Density High Density 
   
Number of tracts 1387 106 
Mean density 3.74 11.34 7.60 
Mean actual productivity 4.35 4.55 0.19 
Mean Ψ  -0.04 0.11 0.15 
Mean θ -0.04 0.10 0.14 
Fitted Marginal Productivity  
At Ψ = 0 (mean)  0.046 0.141 0.095 
At Ψ = 0.4 (+ 1 SE) 0.128 0.235 0.107 
At Ψ = -0.4 (- 1 SE)  -0.035 0.048 0.083 
Notes: Employment density is log employment per sq. mile. We define a low density tract as one where  
this measure falls below 5.5; high density as one where it falls above 10.5 
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Table 10: Decomposition of productivity effects across California Tracts 
Mean Log Productivity in:  
Rural 
 Tracts 
Urban
 Tracts
Urban
  Rural 
  
Conditional on    
- random sorting and random matching  0.000  0.000  0.000
- random sorting and perfect positive assortative matching  0.027 0.029  0.002
- random sorting and perfect negative assortative matching -0.028 -0.027  0.001
- random sorting and actual matching  0.002  0.016  0.013
  
- actual sorting of workers, random sorting of firms and random matching -0.052  0.067  0.119
- actual sorting of firms, random sorting of workers and random matching -0.084  0.035  0.119
- actual sorting of workers and firms, random matching -0.154  0.094  0.248
  
- actual sorting of firms and workers and actual matching -0.135  0.108  0.243
Note: The estimates are based on 100 boot-strapped samples. Rural Tracts are defined as Census Tracts 
with log of employment per square mile in the bottom 5th percentile. Urban Tracts are defined as Census 
Tracts with log of employment per square mile in the top 95th percentile.  
 
 
Table 11: Decomposition of productivity effects across California Counties 
Mean of Log Productivity in:  
Rural 
 Counties 
Urban
 Counties
Urban
  Rural 
  
Conditional on    
- random sorting and random matching  0.000  0.000  0.000
- random sorting and perfect positive assortative matching  0.031  0.031  0.000
- random sorting and perfect negative assortative matching -0.030 -0.031  0.000
- random sorting and actual matching -0.001  0.015  0.017
  
- actual sorting of workers, random sorting of firms and random matching -0.022  0.065  0.088
- actual sorting of firms, random sorting of workers and random matching -0.088  0.124  0.213
- actual sorting of workers and firms, random matching -0.142  0.147  0.293
  
- actual sorting of firms and workers and actual matching -0.109  0.194  0.305
Note: The estimates are based on 100 boot-strapped samples. Rural Counties are defined as Counties 
with log of employment per square mile in the bottom 5th  percentile. Urban Counties are defined as 
Counties with log of employment per square mile in the top 95th percentile. 
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